Page 70 - Vinkler, Jonatan, Ana Beguš and Marcello Potocco. Eds. 2019. Ideology in the 20th Century: Studies of literary and social discourses and practices. Koper: University of Primorska Press
P. 70
Ideology in the 20th Century: studies of literary and social discourses and practices
Kordeš (2004) introduced these theories. In the following, I will outline
these theories and conflate them with some aspects of decolonial studies.
Heinz von Foerster studied physics in Vienna after WW1, where he
was influenced by the philosophy of the Vienna circle. After WW2 he
moved to the USA and worked at the University of Illinois. One of the
basic ideas he introduces in his work is the differentiation between decid-
able and undecidable questions. The first are decidable, because science
can give a provably correct answer to them within its system. The sec-
ond are undecidable, because science cannot prove the correctness or in-
correctness of the possible answers. This allows for a free choice of how
to answer to them (cf. Foerster 2002, 67). One undecidable question con-
cerns epistemology, more precisely, the point of view we choose. Urban
Kordeš exemplifies it with two questions: Am I a part of the world? Or:
70 Do I stand apart of it? (cf. Kordeš 2004, 73). The observer, who chooses
the second possibility, chooses the ‘locus observandi’ (Foerster 2002, 67,
96) that ensures him objectivity and neutrality. From this point of view
he does not interfere with the observed and is himself not influenced by
it. The affirmative answer to the second question means that every time I
act, I change myself and at the same time I change the world (cf. Kordeš
2004, 73). Foerster, who for himself explicitly chose the participatory ob-
servation, i. e. the ‘locus producendi’ (Foerster 2002, 96), understood this
decision as a foundation of his ethics (cf. Foerster 2002, 68). He formu-
lated the idea that this decision is free in a privileged scientific work envi-
ronment, whereas Mignolo sees the decision for an epistemology in spe-
cific historical contexts. Mignolo concludes that the external observer
never was neutral, but always marked, and that the ‘zero point epistemol-
ogy’ never was objective, because it was designed and occupied by privi-
leged male Europeans, representatives of European colonial nations. One
consequence of this is, even today, the use of languages of former colonial
nations in science (cf. Mignolo 2009, 164).
Foersters differentiation of epistemologies and his proposition of a
free choice between them needs the complement of decolonial studies, to
be applicable in specific historical contexts. On the other hand it can help
to solve some contradictions of decolonial studies. Mignolo convincing-
ly shows that the decision for a certain epistemology is not free for every-
body. In the colonial context, it is determined by the ideology of the col-
onizer. However, he also implies that the position of the neutral, external
observer is an illusion or even a deliberate lie to hide the (exploitative)
participation of the observer. From this allegedly neutral position, the
colonizer thinks and works for his own good, harming others. The con-
Kordeš (2004) introduced these theories. In the following, I will outline
these theories and conflate them with some aspects of decolonial studies.
Heinz von Foerster studied physics in Vienna after WW1, where he
was influenced by the philosophy of the Vienna circle. After WW2 he
moved to the USA and worked at the University of Illinois. One of the
basic ideas he introduces in his work is the differentiation between decid-
able and undecidable questions. The first are decidable, because science
can give a provably correct answer to them within its system. The sec-
ond are undecidable, because science cannot prove the correctness or in-
correctness of the possible answers. This allows for a free choice of how
to answer to them (cf. Foerster 2002, 67). One undecidable question con-
cerns epistemology, more precisely, the point of view we choose. Urban
Kordeš exemplifies it with two questions: Am I a part of the world? Or:
70 Do I stand apart of it? (cf. Kordeš 2004, 73). The observer, who chooses
the second possibility, chooses the ‘locus observandi’ (Foerster 2002, 67,
96) that ensures him objectivity and neutrality. From this point of view
he does not interfere with the observed and is himself not influenced by
it. The affirmative answer to the second question means that every time I
act, I change myself and at the same time I change the world (cf. Kordeš
2004, 73). Foerster, who for himself explicitly chose the participatory ob-
servation, i. e. the ‘locus producendi’ (Foerster 2002, 96), understood this
decision as a foundation of his ethics (cf. Foerster 2002, 68). He formu-
lated the idea that this decision is free in a privileged scientific work envi-
ronment, whereas Mignolo sees the decision for an epistemology in spe-
cific historical contexts. Mignolo concludes that the external observer
never was neutral, but always marked, and that the ‘zero point epistemol-
ogy’ never was objective, because it was designed and occupied by privi-
leged male Europeans, representatives of European colonial nations. One
consequence of this is, even today, the use of languages of former colonial
nations in science (cf. Mignolo 2009, 164).
Foersters differentiation of epistemologies and his proposition of a
free choice between them needs the complement of decolonial studies, to
be applicable in specific historical contexts. On the other hand it can help
to solve some contradictions of decolonial studies. Mignolo convincing-
ly shows that the decision for a certain epistemology is not free for every-
body. In the colonial context, it is determined by the ideology of the col-
onizer. However, he also implies that the position of the neutral, external
observer is an illusion or even a deliberate lie to hide the (exploitative)
participation of the observer. From this allegedly neutral position, the
colonizer thinks and works for his own good, harming others. The con-
